

14

WAR AND PEACE TRADE, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

John Shovlin

Much of the classic scholarship on mercantilism suggested that economic competition led to warfare among European states.¹ “Commercial competition . . . plunged nations into one war after another, and gave all wars a turn in the direction of trade, industry, and colonial gain, such as they never had before or after,” wrote Gustav Schmoller.² Mercantilism gave rise to “endless commercial wars,” Eli Heckscher argued.³ According to Edmund Silberner, mercantilist ideas were “responsible for the innumerable wars which ravaged Europe from the seventeenth until the beginning of the nineteenth century.” Mercantilism entailed “continual commercial wars and armed conflicts without end. It led fatally toward war.”⁴ In the spirit of rethinking mercantilism, this chapter reconsiders the relationship between commerce and war in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, and, more generally, the place of economic competition in international politics during this period.

Before sketching the outlines of the argument, some comment is necessary on the use of the word “international” here. Strictly speaking, the term is anachronistic when applied to the seventeenth century or to most of the eighteenth century. The word itself was not invented until the 1780s and not popularized until much later.⁵ Moreover, while it was initially adopted to delineate a world in which sovereign territorial states would be the sole recognized political actors, one of the characteristic features of the early modern period was the key role played by companies, settlers, military contractors, and other quasi-private actors in global politics. If it is legitimate to speak of an international order in this period, it is because Europeans were coming to view war and associated forms of rivalry as pitting whole peoples against one another, rather than being an affair merely of rulers. This shift was mediated, in part, by the adoption of political economic modes of imagining relations among polities.⁶ Once trade had emerged as a key field of contestation, rivalry could be viewed as the competition of

entire populations mobilizing their collective economic resources. In eighteenth-century political economic discourse, it was routine to refer to such competition in national terms.⁷ Something of this sense was captured by the French political economist François Véron de Forbonnais, when in 1753 he coined the expression “the new politics of nations” to refer to the dominant role commerce had come to play as an arena of struggle among European powers.⁸ The emergence of this new politics, and its effects on the international order, forms the principal subject of this chapter.

I seek, first, to clarify the place of trade rivalry in leading to interstate war in Europe. There is a good deal of ambiguity attaching to the very idea of commercial war, as I will show. While control of trade was certainly becoming an important stake of international competition, the number of European wars before the middle of the eighteenth century in which trade was the principal issue was quite limited. A stronger case can be made for the second half of the eighteenth century as an era of war fought for economic ends. The chapter goes on to consider the attitude of contemporary political economists to war and organized violence. Political economic writers usually, though by no means always, conceived of trade as a terrain of struggle among nations, even to the point of equating trade with war. But it does not follow that they viewed violence as an important instrument in winning this contest. Political economy can as readily be seen as a critique of an older paradigm linking conquest with enrichment, and as a vision for a less bloody future in which nations would compete economically rather than militarily. If political economy ultimately conduced to a more unstable and predatory international environment, this was less because economic writers called for war than because thinking about interstate rivalry in economic terms tended to erode traditional constraints on the practice of international politics. The chapter assesses the role of violence in mediating competition among European actors in the non-European world—a zone where profits were principally at stake—and goes on to trace the increasingly predatory character of international politics in Europe as economic rivalry became a more important source of conflict there. I end with a consideration of commercial diplomacy, arguing that treaty making deserves more attention as the decisive moment when unequal trading regimes were forged. It was at the conclusion of wars more often than at their inception that commercial considerations weighed heavily in the calculus of policy makers.

Any effort to clarify the relationship between war and trade in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe must start by clearing up some of the confusion that attaches to the idea of “commercial war,” or “war for trade.” Strictly speaking, it is reductionist to claim that the chief impetus for any war is economic. To do so takes the *preferences* of those who initiate a war as an adequate account of their choice of *means* to achieve those desired ends. Any decision for war will be driven not only by the objectives of policy makers but also by an assessment of the resources available for war,

estimations of the military and financial capacity of the enemy, calculations concerning the likely behavior of other parties should war break out, and an appraisal of the alternative means available to achieve the same results. Thus the commercial ambitions of a polity, considered in isolation, never constitute an adequate explanation of the origins of war.⁹

Moreover, the distinction between wars for trade and wars on trade is sometimes lost in discussions of warfare in this period. It was standard practice in wars conducted between seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European maritime powers to use naval and privateering forces to prey on enemy commerce. One must distinguish, however, between attacks on trade intended to weaken an enemy—virtually universal in the history of warfare—and attacks undertaken with a view to improving a polity’s long-term commercial prospects. When British or Dutch mariners seized Spanish treasure ships they dealt a blow to Spain’s immediate war fighting capacity, but they did not alter, or intend to alter, the structures of economic competition. When naval forces were used to establish permanent enclaves in the West Indies to allow the penetration of Spanish American markets, the results contributed, and were sometimes intended to contribute, to that long-term commercial advantage.¹⁰ We need to keep in view the distinction between economic *objectives* and economic *means* in warfare.

Historians argue that some of the decisive changes in the commercial fortunes of European nations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries followed from success in war—a view I do not challenge. Violence played no small role in the ascent of the Dutch Republic to global trade supremacy in the seventeenth century.¹¹ Later, the failure of the Dutch to meet the challenge of British and French aggression has been identified as a key to the loss of Dutch primacy.¹² Britain’s subsequent rise to commercial hegemony is often linked to victories won in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century wars.¹³ But one must be careful not to read motives back from results. Just because the winners regularly used victory as an opportunity to extort trade concessions from a defeated foe, it does not follow that wars were fought, in the first place, for the sake of such concessions. As Michael Roberts remarks of Charles XII, “In 1705, when he concluded the peace of Warsaw with Augustus II, he inserted economic provisions designed to give Sweden and her provinces a grip on the trade which flowed down the Düna. . . . But from this it is a far cry to proving that it was in order to obtain such advantages that he had crossed the Düna in the first place.”¹⁴

Economic objectives were almost never the sole, and rarely the principal, end of war in Europe before the middle of the eighteenth century but were always conjoined in complex ways with other purposes. Dynastic imperatives, domestic political maneuvering, the desire to maintain a balance of power, and a commitment to sustaining or advancing “reputation,” intersected and competed with political economic goals. One seventeenth-century conflict often viewed as an archetypal commercial war, Louis

XIV's Dutch War (1672–78), seems rather to confirm the importance of non-economic factors. The French king's invasion of the United Provinces in 1672 has been seen as Jean-Baptiste Colbert's effort to usurp the Dutch "rich trades" for France or as an extension of the tariff war triggered by the onerous duties he imposed on a range of imports in 1667.¹⁵ Indeed, in a memorandum of July 8, 1672, the minister proposed that in case of French victory, Louis might demand bases in the Caribbean, South America, the Moluccas, and the Malabar coast, while excluding the Dutch from the Levant trade altogether. Given the timing and context of this memorandum, however, it ought to be viewed as a rationalization of the conflict rather than evidence of the original impetus for war.¹⁶ There can be no doubt that Colbert's trade policy was anti-Dutch, but scholars who have examined the origins of the war have shown that the minister was actually opposed to the conflict, seeing in it the likely ruin of his projects of domestic reform. Colbert failed to restrain his royal master because he feared losing his credit to hawks at court who seemed to enjoy the king's favor.¹⁷

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14), too, is often viewed as a struggle for "the trade of the Indies and the wealth they produce," as Louis XIV put it in a letter of 1709.¹⁸ Commercial considerations were, indeed, important to the Dutch and the English, and to a lesser degree the French, but they were not the cardinal issue for any power. More important for William III and his advisors was the preservation of a balance of power on the continent. A partition of the Spanish inheritance would have been acceptable to the English and the Dutch, even if this meant a significant accession of territory and commercial resources to France. William endorsed two such partition agreements before this design was scuttled by the will of Carlos II and Spanish insistence that his realm remain intact. The chief Dutch war aim was to keep the Spanish Netherlands out of French hands, and later to consolidate a military barrier there against future French aggression. Austria's priorities were, in the first place, dynastic—to support the archduke Charles's claim to the Spanish throne. Secondary aims were to gain control over Milan and Naples. Spain fought to prevent the dismemberment of its empire. Dynastic considerations were more important in the calculations of Louis XIV than was the potential for commercial gains. Of course, commercial objectives cannot be neatly separated from this tangle of strategic, dynastic, and other imperatives, especially from questions of the balance of power, but neither does it make sense to see trade competition as the master logic of the war.

The best candidates for the label "war for trade" were the Anglo-Dutch struggles of the seventeenth century. Navigation, fisheries, and international commerce were the chief stakes of these struggles, though a range of other motivations also came into play without which war would likely never have started. The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–67), for example, developed from clashes on the western coast of Africa between forces of the Dutch West Indies Company, assisted by a Dutch naval squadron, and the

English Company of Royal Adventurers, which sought to break into the Dutch trade in slaves and gold. English forces retaliated for losses sustained in Africa by seizing Dutch ships in the Channel, actions that eventually led to a full scale naval war.¹⁹ The path from trade competition to international military confrontation was mediated by a series of other factors. At the court of Charles II, a faction led by the king's brother, the Duke of York, hoped to use war as a means to increase their own influence at court. The war had a fiscal dimension to the extent that Dutch prizes were expected to refill the royal coffers and reduce Charles II's dependence on parliament. Religious mistrust appears to have been a factor in the conflict, while an ideological element was the antipathy felt by English royalists to Dutch republicanism, which made it plausible to cast the Dutch as a threat to monarchical England.²⁰

The Anglo-Dutch wars excepted, nowhere in Europe between the 1650s and the 1740s was the maximization of commercial advantage the preeminent priority of any European government on entering a major war. It could not be when policy makers were faced with more immediate threats to territorial security, or to the continued existence of the regimes they dominated. Successive British administrations regarded the defense of the British Isles from invasion, and the preservation of a balance of power on the Continent as their chief strategic imperatives, the more so after the Hanoverian Succession when the fate of the British ruler's German electorate had also to be considered.²¹ Trade and colonies played an unusually important role in British national defense because of their role in sustaining naval strength and war finance, but Britain did not go to war for colonial gain before the 1750s.²² French strategic thought was divided after 1713 between continentalists, for whom the containment of the Habsburgs was the key imperative, and Atlanticists who saw France's strategic future in American empire. The former remained dominant until the Austrian alliance of 1756 gave official sanction to the view that Vienna was no longer Versailles' chief rival in Europe.²³ As important as trade and fisheries were to Holland and Zeeland, from the disintegration of the Franco-Dutch alliance in the 1660s until the neutralization of the Austrian Low Countries in 1756, the provinces of the Dutch Republic had to contend with the possibility of French aggression—an existential threat.²⁴ For several decades after 1713, Spain remained focused on recovering its position in Italy and carving out states there for the younger Spanish princes.

It was only from the late 1740s that trade and colonies came to count as much for Spanish and French leaders as they did for the British. The French monarchy initiated a serious program of naval rearmament, launching thirty-seven ships of the line between 1749 and 1755 as part of a strategy of protecting colonies and trade, and limiting growing British hegemony in the Atlantic. French efforts were paralleled by those of Spain, which built thirty-eight warships between 1749 and 1756.²⁵ The French worried that Britain might make itself the arbiter of Europe by securing a virtual

monopoly of Atlantic commerce. In 1755 the duc de Noailles, a member of the French Council of State, argued that the British were engaged in a bid for “universal monarchy” through the domination of American trade. Noailles interpreted British actions in the Ohio territory as part of a plan to destroy the French colonies in North America. The British had already penetrated Spanish America commercially; the destruction of the French empire was a predictable next step in their grand design.²⁶ Spanish policy makers, too, worried that the British sought to be “master of universal commerce in both hemispheres.”²⁷ The settlement of European differences, which Spain achieved with Austria and Sardinia in the 1752 Treaty of Aranjuez, permitted the Spanish to focus on the defense of their American empire and the development of trade.²⁸ The novel French alliance with Austria in 1756 was intended to keep the Continent at peace and thus allow France to pursue a maritime and colonial struggle against the British, a policy that backfired when Prussia invaded Silesia and dragged France into a continental war in defense of its Austrian ally. After the Seven Years’ War, however, the reorientation of French policy would permit British leaders to withdraw from the continental commitments that had dominated policy since the Glorious Revolution while pushing them to defend and consolidate Britain’s dominant position in the Atlantic and India.²⁹

At the same time the French and Spanish monarchies came to view trade, colonies, and the navy as major strategic priorities, they embraced political economy as a key language of state. In the aftermath of the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), the French Intendant of Trade, Jacques-Claude Vincent de Gournay, diagnosed a principal cause of the decay of French power in an inattention to what he called the “science of trade.” He set about systematically encouraging the translation of foreign works of political economy into French, and he commissioned young men in royal service to produce political economic works of their own.³⁰ Gournay’s group produced perhaps forty works, including translations, over the course of the 1750s. But this was only a fraction of the total new French intellectual production in this area. The best recent assessment suggests that new French titles in political economy jumped by a factor of four or five from the 1740s to the 1750s, with nearly four hundred titles published that decade, and more than six hundred in the 1760s.³¹ In Spain, reforming ministers read and recommended works by Child, Cary, Davenant, Forbonnais, Gee, and Hume.³² The 1750s constituted a “take-off” moment for political economic discourse in Europe more broadly. While a handful of works of political economy were translated from one European language into another each decade from the mid-seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth, the number of translations exploded thereafter from a level below twenty translations per decade in the 1730s and 1740s to 134 in the 1750s and 339 in the 1760s.³³ The character of this discourse and its implications for international relations will be the subject of the following sections.

Commerce was widely viewed as a terrain of struggle among states, and metaphors of warfare, weaponry, and battle appealed to many political economic writers and statesmen. For Josiah Child, all trade is “a kind of warfare.” Colbert discerned a “perpetual and peaceful war of wits and industry among all nations.” Pietro Verri saw trade as “a veritable war fought secretly by the various peoples of Europe.”³⁴ If commerce could be viewed as war by other means, conversely, a peace that fostered prosperity could be a proxy for warfare. In the words of Nicolas Dutot, “To make peace in order to reap all the advantages of a great trade is to make war on our enemies. . . . It is in the bosom of our countryside that industry will open to us easy roads to greater conquests. . . . France, superior by the advantages of her trade, will teach neighboring states that she is as capable of increasing her power by peace as by war.”³⁵

Yet there is a difference between actual war and an international struggle conducted using commercial weapons. In so far as it promoted trade as a substitute for war, political economy promised a less bloody world, albeit one in which the struggle of all against all continued unabated. Forbonnais said as much when he celebrated the development of a “new politics of nations” in which trade rather than mutual butchery would be decisive. “It is no longer conquests, carnage, and terror which determines the superiority of an empire,” he wrote; “It is the happiness of its subjects. Its wealth and population are the measures of the eagerness and confidence of its allies, of the respect and attention of its rivals.”³⁶ Such an understanding is not to be confused with the notion that commerce is, or ought to be, the basis of peaceful relations among nations—a view premised on a less agonistic conception of international relations and the belief that commerce in an expression of natural sociability.

Though political economic writers often imagined trade as warlike, it did not follow that they regarded violence as an important means to secure economic advantage. For all the bellicosity of his language, Josiah Child discerned a modest role for military power in fostering trade. A navy and an army adequate for defense, “and Offence upon just occasion,” he argued, “will render us Wise and Honourable in the esteem of other Nations, and consequently oblige them not only to admit us the Freedom of Trade with them, but the better terms for, and countenance in the course of our Trade.”³⁷ He focused on the management of the domestic economy, above all on keeping interest rates low. Such an emphasis on domestic regulation was typical. Political economic literature overwhelmingly concentrated on the proper management of economic resources as the path to wealth and power.

A good deal of the political economy of this age might in fact be seen as an implicit, or explicit, critique of the idea that economic interests could be advanced by war—a call for statesmen to turn their attention to the more prosaic, less glorious, arts of household management on a national scale. In John Locke’s words, “no Body is vain enough to entertain a Thought of our reaping the Profits of the World by our Swords. . . . Commerce

is therefore the only way left to us.³⁸ The same theme was later echoed by John Law who suggested that Louis XIV had simply misunderstood the true basis of power: commerce, not conquest, was the foundation of wealth and thus of national strength. “It is on an extensive commerce, on the number and wealth of inhabitants,” Law argued, “that the power of France ought to be founded.”³⁹ Similar language was used by Jean-François Melon—Law’s former secretary—in his influential *Essai politique sur le commerce* (1734).⁴⁰

Against the dominant view that trade was an arena of international struggle, a small number of writers argued that commerce ought actually to be seen as a basis for peaceful interdependence. Pufendorf elaborated a modern natural jurisprudence founded on the idea that trade is an expression of natural sociability and ought to form a bond between peoples. In France, similar ideas were associated with the political faction linked to Archbishop François Fénelon in the last decades of Louis XIV’s reign, and were used to contest the anti-Dutch foreign policy of the Sun King.⁴¹ Across the channel, pacific understandings of trade were also articulated in the 1690s.⁴² Irenic visions of trade seem to have enjoyed at least moments of political influence, especially in the aftermath of major wars. The French anti-Colbertists scored a triumph at the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) when access to French markets was restored to Dutch traders on the same basis as French subjects.⁴³ British efforts to design a more peaceful and stable international order in the 1710s may have owed something to Pufendorf’s vision, which was attractive to George I.⁴⁴ Philippe d’Orléans admired Fénelon’s ideas, and a member of his entourage, the abbé de Saint-Pierre, elaborated a scheme to create “perpetual peace” in Europe based on a European diet and free trade.⁴⁵ Saint-Pierre saw the Triple Alliance established in 1717 between France, Britain, and the Dutch as a first approximation of such a design.⁴⁶

Whatever their ideological affinity, few political economists regarded war as an appropriate way to augment trade, and this should hardly be surprising. In the short run, conflict was nearly always detrimental to commerce, especially to the trade of maritime states. “Above all things War, and chiefly by Sea, is most prejudicial; and Peace very beneficial for Holland,” Pieter de la Court argued in 1662. As a community dependent on the profits of trade, he observed, Holland was uniquely vulnerable during a conflict. War led to the confiscation of Dutch property in enemy states, to the encroachment by neutrals on formerly Dutch trade routes, and to massive losses from privateering and naval depredations.⁴⁷ In the first Anglo-Dutch War, the Dutch lost perhaps 1,200 ships; in the second, more than 500.⁴⁸ England was no less vulnerable. During the Nine Years’ War (1698–97) approximately 4,000 British merchant vessels were lost; during the War of the Spanish Succession, 3,250; and during the War of the Austrian Succession, 3,238. Only in the Seven Years’ War was the Royal Navy able to protect shipping effectively.⁴⁹ A further disadvantage of war for the richer states was that it served to siphon specie out of the domestic economy via subsidies to foreign

limited role for the exercise of political power. By dominating the East India trade and re-exporting cheaply produced Indian textiles, Charles Davenant argued, England could undersell its European competitors. He also advocated the prohibition of Irish woolen exports, which might destroy their English competition if permitted access to the same markets. Others emphasized purely economic solutions to the problems of rich countries. Henry Martyn argued that the deleterious effects of high wages might be mitigated by adopting labor-saving machinery, which would increase productivity. His was a recipe for permanent technical revolution in the production process. David Hume held that rich countries could preserve their prosperity through improvements in knowledge, while Josiah Tucker argued that abundant capital, technological progress, and the ability to import cheap labor would allow rich countries to preserve their lead indefinitely over low-wage rivals.⁶⁰

Hume, Tucker, and Adam Smith ultimately broke with the view that trade was a substitute for war, criticizing what Hume labeled “jealousy of trade,” the tendency of nations to look with hostility on the commercial success of their rivals.⁶¹ “In opposition to this narrow and malignant opinion,” Hume would show that “the encrease of riches and commerce in any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours.”⁶² It is by no means clear, though, that Hume and Smith’s innovation was fully assimilated by their contemporaries. In France, for example, Hume’s arguments were read not as a rejection of Colbert’s “perpetual and peaceful war of wits and industry among all nations” but as a more sophisticated prescription for how to win it. Hume’s political economic writings were translated by members of the Gournay circle alongside works by Cary, Child, Culpeper, Gee, Ulloa, and Uztáriz. Read in this company, the more irenic dimensions of Hume’s thinking were de-emphasized if not lost altogether.⁶³

Traditional scholarship on the history of economic thought holds that a decisive break divided “mercantilist” thought from the “liberal” doctrines of the latter half of the eighteenth century. In terms of the way international order was imagined and represented, it may be that the more significant caesura lies in the seventeenth century between an era, in which war was seen as a path to public enrichment, and an age when such an assumption lost force. This break has been obscured by the continuing appeal of war as a metaphor for trade, and the profoundly agonistic way in which international trade continued to be imagined. While this way of envisioning commerce was challenged, in turn, during the second half of the eighteenth century by writers of a more liberal bent, the latter rarely denied the significance of economic success to power politics and, on the Continent, the new political economy was shaped by an emulative framework in which the goal was to identify the secret of British success and to close the cross-Channel gap in wealth and power.⁶⁴

If the political economy of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries rarely touted war as a means to achieve economic ends, there might nevertheless have been

ways in which political economic modes of thought exacerbated the violence and instability of the international order. There certainly appears to be a correlation between the tendency to see interstate rivalry in economic terms and a growing ruthlessness in European affairs, and it may have been that Forbonnais's "new politics of nations," ironically, eroded traditional constraints on the practice of international politics. A realm where economic rivalry had long played a very prominent political role—the zone of interaction between European actors overseas—appears to have been governed by more predatory norms than political space in Europe. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the distinction between these two realms at least partially dissolved, and the more ruthless norms of the zone of extra-European economic competition appear to have been imported into Europe while international competition there came increasingly to be viewed in economic terms.

In Europe, relationships among polities were still shaped to some degree in the eighteenth century by norms of dynastic sovereignty.⁶⁵ Some of the central patterns of eighteenth-century European interstate politics are inconceivable absent the logic of dynasticism: witness Charles VI's thirty-year effort to win acceptance for the Pragmatic Sanction, the Jacobite challenge to the Hanoverian monarchy, or Spanish efforts to transform the Utrecht settlement in Italy. Dynastic claims could give rise to, and justify, conflict; such claims were often at issue in the major wars of the age, as in the cases of the English, Spanish, and Austrian succession struggles. Dynastic right could also serve to veil aggression undertaken for other reasons. But if it often led to conflict, dynasticism also functioned as a moderating norm in European politics, limiting the kinds of claims that could legitimately be made to territory, containing the stakes of war, establishing norms of compensation when rulers suffered loss of territories to which they had recognized dynastic claims, and requiring the regularization of shifts in sovereignty through formal treaties.⁶⁶ Reason of state eroded the force of dynastic sovereignty, but it was a slow-acting poison the full effects of which took a long time to become fully manifest. Limited by norms of dynasticism, and to some degree also by the law of nations, European interstate politics in the early modern period was not a Darwinian struggle for survival; few states disappeared as a consequence of military defeat.⁶⁷ This was to change in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and the growing tendency to conceive of power in economic terms may have been a key factor in mediating this shift.

Trade competition was a dimension of rivalry in which norms of dynastic sovereignty were irrelevant or largely so. Dynasticism was tied to a territorial imagination. It had developed in Europe as a normative system for the establishment of legitimate claims over territory and populations. Dynastic ideas had little purchase in interactions where trade, bases, and control of sea lanes, rather than sovereignty over cities and provinces in Europe, were the stakes of conflict. Moreover, trade competition was

modern and was perceived as such. The charters and genealogies on which the legalistic claims of dynasticism were founded had little to say about the world of commerce. Where dynastic claims were weak or nonexistent, and where rivalry among Europeans was principally a rivalry for trade—namely in the “Indies”—one comes closest to that world of “continual commercial wars and armed conflicts without end” envisioned by Silberner and other classic historians of mercantilism. The key European actors in this zone were not states or governments but companies, settlers, freebooters, and privateers, which further minimized the relevance of dynastic constraints.

Organized violence was the handmaiden of trade in the Indian Ocean and in the Americas, where force was often the arbiter of conflicts among European chartered companies or settlers. The clearest example of a war fought for trade was the long struggle carried on between 1598 and 1663 by the Dutch Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) to oust the Portuguese Estado da India from the Spice Islands, Ceylon, and Southern India. In 1614, Jan Pieterszoon Coen of the VOC argued that “trade in Asia must be driven and maintained under the protection and favour of Your Honour’s own weapons, and that the weapons must be paid for by the profits from the trade; so that we cannot carry on trade without war nor war without trade.”⁶⁸ Like the Dutch before them, the English also fought and harried the Portuguese in Asia. Relations between the English and the Dutch were often violent, with their nadir in 1623 when the VOC governor at Amboyna had ten employees of the English East India Company (EIC) tortured and executed. In their relations with local rulers in India also, servants of the EIC believed the power of reprisal was an important guarantee of advantageous trade relations.⁶⁹

One can discern three phases in the relationship between the European regional states system and the realm of intra-European competition in the Indies. Until the middle of the seventeenth century, European rulers were content, either by express agreement or implicit understanding, to allow a state of virtual war to prevail between their subjects in those parts of the world “beyond the line.”⁷⁰ From the 1640s, peace agreements made in Europe began to be extended to the Indies. The United Provinces concluded a truce with Portugal in 1641, which was eventually imposed on the VOC and extended to the East Indies in 1644. The Treaty of Münster (1648) between Spain and the Dutch extended to the Indies, and this was increasingly the pattern in subsequent treaties ending major European wars. Conversely, war in Europe increasingly spilled over into the Indian Ocean and the Americas. The EIC suffered mightily from Dutch attacks during the first Anglo-Dutch conflict (1652–54); the French temporarily lost Pondicherry to the VOC in 1693, during the Nine Years’ War; every major Franco-British altercation from the 1690s on had a New World dimension.⁷¹ Despite this convergence of the two zones, however, aggressive and predatory behavior pitting Europeans against one another remained common in the Indies without such aggression

leading to war in Europe. In the 1720s, for example, Dutch traders conducted a virtual war against the Ostend Company, which was seeking to establish a competing trade to the Indian Ocean and China.⁷²

The third phase in the relationship between Europe and the zone of European competition overseas began in the 1750s when, for the first time, a colonial dispute in America was the chief impetus for a major conflict in Europe—the Franco-British dimension of the Seven Years’ War. Colonies and the commerce they sustained were coming to be seen as a decisive factor in the European balance of power. As economic rivalry became more central to politics in Europe itself, norms of dynastic sovereignty appear to have been eroded, and European politics became more predatory. The first clear movement in this direction was Prussia’s invasion and annexation of Silesia in 1740–41. Frederick II had no dynastic claim to Silesia, a Habsburg province rich in both mining and manufacturing wealth. The Prussian monarch had broken with the dynastic thinking of his father to embrace a thoroughgoing reason of state, a shift some scholars attribute to his engagement with Enlightenment rationalism, but which might also be linked to the growing centrality of economic competition as an arena of great power politics.⁷³ Economic considerations became much more central to the power-political thinking of Prussian and Austrian policy makers in the middle decades of the century. Territories came more and more to be seen as fungible demographic and economic resources, rather than as bundles of dynastic rights.⁷⁴ The partitions of Poland among Prussia, Austria, and Russia in the early 1770s and in the 1790s would seem to be the logical outcome of such a doctrine, though dynastic claims were also weak in this elective monarchy. The French decision to support the American revolutionaries in their rebellion against George III might be seen as another example of the weakening of dynastic constraints and the increasingly predatory cast of international relations. The stakes of French intervention in America were economic—overturning British dominance of North Atlantic trade.⁷⁵ The framing of rivalry in economic terms may have facilitated a suspension of dynastic norms.

If the role of trade rivalry as a direct cause of war in Europe before the middle of the eighteenth century has been overstated, commercial diplomacy merits more attention as a practice shaping the regime of global trade. Most of the major peace accords concluded between European sovereigns, from the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) through the Peace of Paris (1783), had significant commercial dimensions. In addition, numerous trade agreements were forged between European powers in peacetime.⁷⁶ Commercial treaties typically set out the terms on which the nationals of one polity might trade in another. Treaties could extend most-favored-nation status, or even accord to foreign merchants the same rights and privileges enjoyed by a state’s own citizens—as in the commercial clauses of the Franco-Dutch treaties of Ryswick (1697) and Utrecht (1713).⁷⁷ Commercial treaties usually sought to guarantee prompt and impartial justice in commercial disputes, and rights of residence and freedom from molestation for

merchants. Trade treaties often established norms for wartime trade also. The Anglo-Swedish treaty of 1661, for example, permitted trading with the enemy in wartime, except in specifically defined contraband goods.⁷⁸

Trade treaties became increasingly necessary as European governments from the late seventeenth century hedged their domestic markets with higher tariffs, or in some cases outright prohibitions, on foreign goods. French tariffs rose sharply under Colbert—notoriously with the tariff of 1667. Between 1690 and 1705, English tariffs on imports increased from a low 5 percent to 15, 20, or even 25 percent on some goods.⁷⁹ In the 1710s and 1720s, similar policies followed in Austria, Denmark, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden.⁸⁰ As tariff barriers rose, so did the potential rewards of successful diplomacy. When diplomacy failed, the result could be a tariff war or destructive prohibitions of imports. Following the introduction of the tariff of 1667, tariff wars erupted between France and Milan, the Papal States and the United Provinces.⁸¹ In 1678 the English Parliament passed a three-year embargo on French imports. In the interval between the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession, French goods entering England faced 50 percent *ad valorem* duties. When negotiations for a commercial treaty failed in 1699 the French imposed higher duties on English textiles, prohibiting some altogether.⁸²

Diplomatic alignments, and the commercial accords they made possible, could be the key to obtaining economic advantages for a state's nationals. As Josiah Child remarked in 1693, "The well contrivment and management of Foreign Treaties, may very much contribute to the making it the Interest of other Nations to Trade with us, at least to the convincing of Foreign *Princes* wherein, and how it is their Interest to trade with us."⁸³ The Methuen Treaty (1703) guaranteed privileged access to the English market for Portuguese wines, while opening Portugal and Brazil to English textiles.⁸⁴ The later Anglo-Russian commercial treaty of 1734, which granted Britain most-favored-nation status and a one-third tariff reduction on specified imports into Russia, has been credited with winning British merchants a dominant position in European trade with Russia during the eighteenth century. By 1756, more than half of all St. Petersburg's European commerce was carried on with Britain.⁸⁵

Not all commercial diplomacy was geared to establishing more favorable terms of trade, however. Governments could also use trade concessions instrumentally, as a means to create closer political ties or to secure strategic advantages. Thus the Ottomans made agreements with the English and the Dutch in the seventeenth century, in part, to create a counterweight to Spanish naval strength in the Mediterranean.⁸⁶ The Franco-British commercial treaty negotiated as part of the broader Peace of Utrecht (1713), but rejected by the House of Commons, appears to have been designed to improve the political relationship between Britain and France.⁸⁷ Spain signed trade deals with Britain in 1715 and 1716 in the vain hope of winning British support for the

do so ambiguously, if at all. I underline the limits of a vision that sees economic rivalry as a direct cause of war between European states, while conceding that this perspective may better characterize the period after 1748, as it certainly does the struggles of the East India companies, or competing groups of European settlers in the Americas. I also underline the defects of a perspective that reads economic writing in this period as a call for war. At a minimum, there is a deep ambivalence about war in the political economy of the age of mercantilism. Political economists often envisioned trade as a kind of warfare, but international struggle conducted by commercial means was a very different prospect to actual warfare. Moreover, few economic writers saw violence as an important element in winning the economic struggle among nations. If the rise of political economic modes of imagining and representing the power of nations fostered the development of a more predatory and unstable international order in Europe—which it may well have—this development should be seen as ironic.

If the importance of trade as an impetus for war in Europe has been exaggerated, and if few political economists viewed war as the road to wealth, how did organized violence come to play such an important role in shaping trade relations in and beyond Europe? Part of the answer lies with the role of violence in mediating the struggle among Europeans in the Americas and the Indian Ocean. The distinction between Europe and the Indies was imagined by contemporaries in geographical terms, but the Indies can also be viewed as a functionally different space in which relations were organized according to different imperatives than in Europe. “Beyond the line” companies and settlers rather than governments were the key actors, and rivalry for trade could be pursued in a purer form than in Europe, unconstrained by the dynastic and strategic imperatives that dominated politics in the Old World. But wars fought in Europe, and diplomatic accords brokered there, ultimately had a more important bearing on shaping the terms of trade. This was not, in the main, because European wars were fought to win commercial advantage. Rather, whatever the original cause of war, trade concessions were among the benefits the winner could wrest from a defeated foe. This was the juncture when governments were most likely to consult their commercial interests, and when commercial expertise was brought to bear on shaping relations between states. Treaties merit more attention as the moments when the regime of global trade was forged, when the “new politics of nations” shaped the international order most decisively.

NOTES

1. I am grateful to Phil Stern and Carl Wennerlind for their editorial suggestions. I received valuable comments and questions from participants in the European History Workshop at New York University; special thanks to Guy Ortolano, Andrew Sartori, and Larry Wolff. I also want to thank Gabriel Paquette for an incisive reading of an early draft of this chapter.

2. Gustav Schmoller, *The Mercantile System and Its Historical Significance* (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1967 [1884]), 64.
3. Eli F. Heckscher, *Mercantilism*, trans. Mendel Shapiro, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), 2:25.
4. Edmond Silberner, *La guerre dans la pensée économique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1939), 117–18. Such understandings are often echoed today, albeit in more nuanced terms, and more often in general surveys than in specialist scholarship. See François Crouzet, *La guerre économique franco-anglaise au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 2008), 1–2; Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, *Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 238–62; Bruce P. Lenman, *England's Colonial Wars 1550–1688: Conflicts, Empire and National Identity* (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 201; Lars Magnusson, *Mercantilism: The Shaping of an Economic Language* (London: Routledge, 1994), 95–97.
5. Hidemi Suganami, "A Note on the Origin of the Word 'International,'" *British Journal of International Studies* 4 (1978): 226–32; C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 236–43.
6. The emergence of national identities among European populations, and the instrumentalization of national feeling by governments in their efforts to mobilize civilian populations in wartime, also played an important role in encouraging Europeans to think of wars in national terms. See David A. Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
7. See, for example, Daniel Defoe's discussion of the economic activities of "all the Trading Nations of the World" in a lengthy appendix to his *Plan of the English Commerce* (London: Charles Rivington, 1730).
8. François Véron de Forbonnais, *Théorie et pratique du commerce et de la marine* (Paris: Veuve Estienne, 1753), iv.
9. For a quirky but acute discussion of these crucial distinctions, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of Wars* (New York: Free Press, 1973).
10. Jamaica and French Saint-Domingue were initially established as bases from which to plunder Spanish shipping and colonies, not with a view to long term commercial penetration of Spanish America. But in time these colonies came to assume a new function, while new colonies like Louisiana were envisioned as having this role from their inception.
11. C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800* (New York: Knopf, 1965), 84–112; Jonathan Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 67–73.
12. Patrick O'Brien, "Mercantilism and Imperialism in the Rise and Decline of the Dutch and British Economies 1585–1815," *De Economist* 148, no. 4 (2000): 469–501.
13. François Crouzet, "The Second Hundred Years War: Some Reflections," *French History* 10, no. 4 (1996): esp. 448–50; Kenneth Morgan, "Mercantilism and the British Empire, 1688–1815," *The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688–1914*, ed. Donald Winch and Patrick K. O'Brien (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Patrick K. O'Brien, "Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire," in *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 2, *The Eighteenth Century*, ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 53–77.
14. Michael Roberts, *The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560–1718* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 41.

15. For versions of the “commercial war” thesis, see Charles Woolsey Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*, 2 vols. (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964), 1:432, 439, 445; 2:551; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 295–96.
16. J.-B. Colbert, *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert*, ed. Pierre Clément, 7 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1861–1873), 7:658–59.
17. Paul Sonnino, *Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 7. See also John A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714* (London: Longman, 1999), 29.
18. Auguste-Théodore Girardot, ed., *Correspondance de Louis XIV avec M. Amelot, son ambassadeur en Espagne 1705–1709* (Paris: Aubry, 1864), 2:121.
19. For the commercial war thesis, see Findlay and O'Rourke, *Power and Plenty*, 238–45; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 271; Charles Wilson, *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (London: Longmans, 1957), 111–42, 147.
20. Tony Claydon, *Europe and the Making of England, 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 133–52; J. R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (London: Longman, 1996); Charles-Édouard Levillain, *Vaincre Louis XIV: Angleterre, Hollande, France, histoire d'une relation triangulaire 1665–1688* (Seysssel: Champ Vallon, 2010), 42–75; Steven Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 195–268; Gijs Rommelse, “Mountains of Iron and Gold: Mercantilist Ideology and Anglo-Dutch Relations (1650–1674),” in *Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–1750)*, ed. David Onnekink and Gijs Rommelse (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011).
21. Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714–1783* (London: Allen Lane, 2007). See also H. M. Scott, “‘The True Principles of the Revolution’: The Duke of Newcastle and the Idea of the Old System,” in *Knights Errant and True Englishmen: British Foreign Policy, 1660–1800*, ed. Jeremy Black (Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1989).
22. Daniel A. Baugh, “Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce: The Uses of a ‘Grand Marine Empire,’” in *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815*, ed. Lawrence Stone (London: Routledge, 1994).
23. Dale Miquelon, “Envisioning the French Empire: Utrecht, 1711–1713,” *French Historical Studies* 24, no. 4 (2001): 653–77; John Shovlin, “Selling American Empire on the Eve of the Seven Years War: The French Propaganda Campaign of 1755–1756,” *Past and Present* 206 (2010): 121–49.
24. Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1095.
25. Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860*, 2 vols. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), 1:265–66; Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 234–35, 241–42.
26. Adrien-Maurice de Noailles, “Mémoire sur la conjoncture présente,” February 1755, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Mémoires et Documents, Angleterre 52, fols. 103–112.
27. Quoted in Gabriel B. Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759–1808* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), 37. See also Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, 249.
28. Daniel Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War, 1754–1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest* (New York: Longman, 2011), 100. See also Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, 238, 242.

29. Daniel A. Baugh, "Withdrawing from Europe: Anglo-French Maritime Geopolitics, 1750–1800," *International History Review* 20, no. 1 (1998): 1–32.
30. Loïc Charles, Frédéric Lefebvre and Christine Théré, eds., *Le cercle de Vincent de Gournay: savoirs économiques et pratiques administratives en France au milieu du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Institut national d'études démographiques, 2011); Simone Meyssonnier, *La balance et l'horloge: la genèse de la pensée libérale en France au XVIIIe siècle* (Montreuil: Éditions de la Passion, 1989), 161–236; Antoin E. Murphy, "Le développement des idées économiques en France (1750–1756)," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 33 (1986): 521–41; Arnault Skornicki, *L'économiste, la cour et la patrie: l'économie politique dans la France des Lumières* (Paris: CNRS, 2011), 89–102.
31. Christine Théré, "Economic Publishing and Authors, 1566–1789," *Studies in the History of French Political Economy: From Bodin to Walras*, ed. Gilbert Faccarello (London: Routledge, 1998).
32. Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform*, 36–45.
33. Sophus A. Reinert, *Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 46–60.
34. Child's statement is from the minute book of the Committee Concerning Trade (1669), and is quoted in William Letwin, *Origins of Scientific Economics: English Economic Thought, 1660–1778* (London: Methuen, 1963), 44; Colbert, *Lettres, instructions et mémoires*, 6:269; Pietro Verri, *Elementi del commercio* (Milan, 1760), 335. Quoted in Silberner, *La guerre dans la pensée économique*, 108–9.
35. Nicolas Dutot, *Réflexions politiques sur les finances, et le commerce*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Frères Vaillant & N. Prevost, 1738), 2:403–4. The best treatment of this "commerce as conquest" theme is to be found in Reinert, *Translating Empire*, 13–29.
36. Forbonnais, *Théorie et pratique du commerce*, iii.
37. Josiah Child, *A New Discourse of Trade* (London: John Everingham, 1693), 159.
38. John Locke, *Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of Money* (London: Awnsham and John Churchill, 1692), 14–15.
39. John Law to Philippe d'Orléans, December 1715, in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Paul Harsin, 3 vols. (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1934), 2:266–67.
40. Paul Cheney, *Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 40.
41. Lionel Rothkrug, *The Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 330–32. See also Michael Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 109–12.
42. For Nicholas Barbon, "Another Benefit of Trade, is, That, it doth not only bring Plenty, but hath occasioned Peace." Peace, in turn, he argued, promoted trade. Nicholas Barbon, *A Discourse of Trade* (London: Tho. Milbourn, 1690), 37–39, 62. Dudley North also rejected the idea of trade as a battleground, going so far as to affirm that "the whole world as to trade is but as one nation or people, and therein nations are as persons." Dudley North, *Discourses upon Trade, Principally Directed to the Cases of the Interest, Coynage, Clipping, Increase of Money* (London: Tho. Basset, 1691), 22, and unpaginated preface.
43. Rothkrug, *Opposition to Louis XIV*, 434.
44. Ragnhild Hatton, *George I, Elector and King* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 165, 224; Hatton, *War and Peace, 1680–1720* (London, 1969).
45. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Jean-François Fitou, *Saint-Simon, and the Court of Louis XIV*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 263; Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (Utrecht: A. Schouten, 1713).

46. Ira O. Wade, "The Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Dubois," *Journal of Modern History* 2, no. 3 (1930): 430–47.
47. Pieter de la Court, *The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and West-Friesland* (London, 1702 [1662]), 231–32.
48. Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 210, 278.
49. John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 197–98.
50. Thomas Mun, *England's Treasure by Forraign Trade* (London, J.G. for T. Clark, 1664), 52–53.
51. G. N. Clark, *The Dutch Alliance and the War Against French Trade 1688–1697* (Manchester: The University Press, 1923), 135–37.
52. Richard Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies 1739–1763* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), 343–44.
53. Anon., *The Advantages of Peace and Commerce: With Some Remarks on the East-India Trade* (London: J. Brotherton and Tho. Cox, 1729); Thomas Merchant, *Peace and Trade, War and Taxes: or, The Irreparable Damage of Our Trade in Case of a War* (London: J. Brindley, 1729).
54. Philip Woodfine, "The Anglo-Spanish War of 1739," *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Jeremy Black (Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1987). See also Jean O. McLachlan, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750: A Study of the Influence of Commerce on Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1940).
55. [Horatio Walpole], *The Grand Question, Whether War, or No War, with Spain* (London: J. Roberts, 1739), 8.
56. C. Ferguson, *A Letter Address'd to Every Honest Man in Britain* (London: John Cooper, 1738), 32. For similar arguments, see Anon., *Strenuous Motives for an Immediate War against Spain* (London: G. Spavan, 1738); Anon., *A Letter from a Spaniard in London to his Friend at Madrid* (London: J. Standen, 1739); Anon., *Peace and No Peace* (London: R. Chissen, n.d.) [1739]; [Benjamin Robins], *Observations on the Present Convention with Spain* (London: T. Cooper, 1739).
57. Anon., *An Impartial Enquiry into the Advantages and Losses that England Hath Received Since the Beginning of this Present War with France* (London: Richard Baldwin, 1693); William Carter, *The Usurpations of France Upon the Trade of the Woollen Manufacture of England Briefly Hinted at* (London: Richard Baldwin, 1695); James Whiston, *A Discourse of the Decay of Trade* (London: Samuel Crouch, 1693).
58. [Gatien Courtilz de Sandras], *Testament politique du marquis de Louvois, premier ministre d'État sous le regne de Louis XIV* (Cologne: Chez le Politique, 1695), 514–16.
59. See, for example, John Cary, *An Essay on the State of England in Relation to Its Trade, Its Poor, and Its Taxes, for Carrying on the Present War Against France* (Bristol: W. Bonny, 1695), unpaginated dedication; Charles Davenant, *An Essay Upon Ways and Means of Supplying the War* (London: Jacob Tonson, 1695), 29–30.
60. Istvan Hont, "The 'Rich Country—Poor Country' Debate in the Scottish Enlightenment," in *Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 267–322.
61. Hont, *Jealousy of Trade*, 53–57.
62. David Hume, "Of the Jealousy of Trade," *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* (Edinburgh: R. Fleming, A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, 1758). Smith and Tucker took a similar position. See Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Edwin Cannan (London: Methuen, 1904 [1776]), book 5, ch. 3, §38; Josiah Tucker, *The*

- Case of Going to War, for the Sake of Procuring, Enlarging, or Securing of Trade* (London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1763), 35–36.
63. On the Gournay circle's reading of Hume, see Loïc Charles, "French 'New Politics' and the Dissemination of Hume's *Political Discourses* on the Continent," in *David Hume's Political Economy*, ed. Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind (London: Routledge, 2008). Adam Smith's work, famously, made little impression in Continental Europe before the 1790s and, where it was read, the novelty of Smith's position was rarely grasped. In Germany, for example, Smith's ideas seem at first to have been assimilated to existing cameralist frameworks. Keith Tribe, *Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic Discourse, 1750–1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 133–48.
64. Reinert, *Translating Empire*, passim.
65. Lucien Bély, *La société des princes XVIe–XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1999).
66. An excellent case for the moderating effects of dynastic sovereignty is made by Charles Ingraio, "Paul W. Schroeder's Balance of Power: Stability or Anarchy?" *International History Review* 16, no. 4 (1994): 681–700. Theoretical foundations for such a position can be found in Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.
67. Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–87.
68. Boxer, *Dutch Seaborne Empire*, 86, 96; C. R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415–1825* (Manchester: Carcanet, 1991 [1969]), 109–14; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 936.
69. Lenman, *England's Colonial Wars*, 187–92; K. N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 110–19; Bruce I. Watson, "Fortifications and the 'Idea' of Force in Early English East India Company Relations with India," *Past and Present* 88 (1980): 70–87. If war for trade was more a reality in the Indian Ocean or the Americas than in Europe, even there its role was limited. In all the companies there were struggles over the utility of organized violence as a mode of sustaining profit. Company directors were usually critical of the use of violent tactics in the Indies when these proved expensive. Moreover, some of the violent actions taken by companies had little to do with immediate commercial advantage, being driven by diplomatic and military rivalries they encountered in Asia. Relations among Europeans in the Indies never constituted a normless Hobbesianism because actors carried with them, and used eclectically, a battery of claims, practices and ideas derived from European legal traditions. See Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
70. Ian Kenneth Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675–1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 189–92; Martin Wight, "The Origins of Our States System: Geographical Limits," in *Systems of States*, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), 124–25; Garrett Mattingly, "No Peace Beyond What Line?" *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., 13 (1963): 145–62.
71. Agreements made between the companies could also limit the effects of European war in Asia, as when François Martin of the French company concluded an unofficial truce with Thomas Pitt of the EIC during the War of the Spanish Succession. See M. S. Naravane, *Battles of the Honourable East India Company: Making of the Raj* (New Delhi: A. P. H. Pub. Corp., 2006), 151.
72. Georges-Henri Dumont, *L'épopée de la Compagnie d'Ostende, 1723–1727* (Brussels: Cri, 2000).

73. T. C. W. Blanning, "Frederick the Great and Enlightened Absolutism," in *Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe*, ed. H. M. Scott (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
74. Harm Klueting, *Die Lehre von der Macht der Staaten: Das außenpolitische Machtproblem in der "politischen Wissenschaft" und in der praktischen Politik im 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1986). There is some debate about the centrality of economic thinking among Frederick's motives, but it is clear that he viewed wealth as a key underpinning of power. See Theodor Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, trans. Sabina Berkeley and H. M. Scott (London: Longman, 2000), 90–101, 196–204; Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of Frederick the Great* (London: Longman, 1996), 40.
75. Some historians focused on the period of the Napoleonic Wars argue that norms formerly typical of European behavior in the Indies came to be imported into European politics. See Michael Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796–1814: Cultural Imperialism in a European Context?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 392; Stuart Woolf, "French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire," *Past and Present* 124 (1989), 96–120.
76. Douglas K. Reading, *The Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1938), 9; Arthur McCandless Wilson, *French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury 1726–1743* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), 61–62.
77. *A Collection of Treaties of Peace and Commerce* (London: J. Baker, 1714), 139–42.
78. H. S. K. Kent, *War and Trade in the Northern Seas: Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Relations in the Mid-Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 2.
79. Ralph Davis, "The Rise of Protection in England, 1689–1786," *Economic History Review* 19, no. 2 (1966): 306–17.
80. Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 384–86.
81. Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*, 1:433–36, 440–45
82. D. C. Coleman, "Politics and Economics in the Age of Anne: The Case of the Anglo-French Trade Treaty of 1713," in *Trade, Government, and Economy in Pre-Industrial England*, ed. D. C. Coleman and A. H. John (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), 189.
83. Child, *New Discourse of Trade*, 160–61.
84. A. D. Francis, "John Methuen and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaties of 1703," *Historical Journal* 3, no. 2 (1960): 103–24.
85. Reading, *Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty*, 295.
86. H. de Groot, "The Organization of Western European Trade in the Levant, 1500–1800," in *Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading Companies During the Ancien Régime*, ed. Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (The Hague: Leiden University Press, 1981), 232.
87. The architect of the negotiation, Henry St. John, told Matthew Prior, the chief British negotiator, that "This is calculated to hinder those prejudices, which our people have been possessed with against France. . . . When once our people have felt the sweet of carrying on a trade to France, under reasonable regulations, the artifices of Whiggism will have the less effect upon them." See Isaac Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968), 12.
88. Basil Williams, *Stanhope: A Study in Eighteenth-Century War and Diplomacy* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1932), 206–8.
89. Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815* (London: Longman, 1983), 136.

90. L. Jay Oliva, *Misalliance: A Study of French Policy in Russia during the Seven Years' War* (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 122.
91. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, 59–64. Asymmetries in power, however, could not always be translated into favorable trading regimes. The Anglo-Swedish and Anglo-Danish treaties of 1661 and 1670, respectively, constitute a telling exception. These treaties established free British access to Scandinavian markets, with British merchants to pay only the same duty as subjects of the Swedish and Danish crowns. By the early eighteenth century, however, both Baltic powers had adopted trade policies that effectively closed their domestic markets to English wares. Neither the English, nor subsequently the British, crown took any retaliatory action, despite numerous threats to do so, because Britain remained dependent on the Scandinavian powers for naval stores, because the merchant interest directly injured by the Danish and Swedish exclusions was minor, and because Denmark and Sweden could look to France for diplomatic and military protection. See H. S. K. Kent, *War and Trade in the Northern Seas*, 1–13.
92. Rothkrug, *Opposition to Louis XIV*, 398.
93. On Mesnager, see Thomas J. Schaeper, *The French Council of Commerce 1700–1715: A Study of Mercantilism after Colbert* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1983), 234–36. On Moore's role, see H. T. Dickinson, *Bolingbroke* (London: Constable, 1970), 107. On Gilligan, see Philip Woodfine, "Sutton, Robert, second Baron Lexington (1661–1723)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, 137.